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LABOR LAW
DEFINITION OF LABOR DISPUTE
The plaintiff, Paul Senn, was a tile contractor operating in Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin. He employed several tile layers and helpers who
were non-union employees and who had no desire to join the union
and he worked along side his men at the trade. The defendant Tile
Layers' Union desired that Senn become a union contractor. Senn was
willing to unionize his business but he would not comply with the
union's demand that he refrain from working with his men as a laborer.
Accordingly the union placed four pickets bearing "unfair" signs in
front of the building which served as plaintiff's home and office. The
picketing was without violence and was unaccompanied by any unlawful
act. The plaintiff asked that the picketing be enjoined contending that
no trade dispute existed. Both the trial court and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held the picketing to be legal under the Wisconsin anti-
injunction statute which permitted peaceful picketing (Wisc. Stat.
I03.51-IO3.63). Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, Local No. 5,
222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 27o, re-hearing denied 222 Wis. 383, 268
N.W. 872 (93I). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the state courts, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 8i L. Ed. 854 (i937).
In those states that consider peaceful picketing to be lawful (See
Oakes, Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts (927) p. 456), it
is generally assumed that an actual trade dispute must exist before labor
can utilize this weapon.
An early interpretation of the term "trade dispute" arose under
section 2o of the Clayton Act [38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) 29 U. S.
C.A., sec. 52 (927)] which provided:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an em-
ployer and employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking em-
ployment, involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property,
or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury
there is no adequate remedy at law. ...
In Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct.
172, 65 L. Ed. 349, I6 A.L.R. 196 (i921), it was held that the terms
"cemployer and employees" as used in the act prevented persons other
than laborers actually employed by plaintiff from availing themselves of
the restrictions against injunction-that members of the union to which
the employees belonged could not boycott the employer. This construc-
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tion was accepted in later decisions: American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
Ctky Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed.
189, 27 A.L.R. 36o (1921); Waitresses' Union v. Benish Restaurant
Go., (1925, C.C.A. 8th) 6 Fed. (2d) 568); International Organiza-
tion, U. M. WT. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., (927,
C.C.A. 4 th) 18 Fed. (2d) 839 certiorari denied 275 U.S. 536, 72 L.
Ed. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 31 (1927); irmstrong v. United States (1927,
C.C.A. 7 th) 18 Fed. (2d) 371 certiorari denied 275 U.S. 534, 72 L.
Ed. 412, 48 Sup. Ct. 30 (1927).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 Stat. 70 (932), 29 U.S.C.A.
100-I15) and its counterparts now in effect in 14 states represent
another attempt by legislatures to limit the use of the injunction in labor
controversies. Sec. 113 defines a labor dispute as:
Any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or" con-
cerning the association, or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ-
ment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee (italics author's).
Despite the emphatic wording of this statute some courts have stated
that a labor dispute can exist only between an employer and his immedi-
ate employees. United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 8o Fed. (2d) x
(1935, C.C.A. 7 th), certiorari denied 297 U.S. 714 (1936); Lauf v.
E. G. Shimmer & Co., 82 Fed (2d) 68 (1936, C.C.A. 7 th); Scav-
enger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 Fed. (2d) 825 (1936, C.C.A.
7 th); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 5 1 Pac. (2d) 372
(Wash., 1935), 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 771 and 1027 (1936).
It is fair to conclude that until recently the prevalent judicial atti-
tude toward labor disputes has been to confine the concept to the small,
relatively unimportant conflicts that occur between the individual em-
ployer and his immediate employees even in the face of express legisla-
tive mandate to the contrary.
Prior to many of the cases set forth above, however, a trend toward
a more liberal construction of the term "labor dispute" was discernible.
In Exchange Baking Co. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130
(1927), it was stated (p. 263):
All engaged in a trade are affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All,
by the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization today is not
based on the single shop. Unions believe that wages may be increased, collec-
tive bargaining maintained only if union conditions prevail not in some single
factory but generally. That they may prevail it may call a strike and picket the
premises of an employer with the intent of inducing him to employ only union
labor and it may adopt either method separately.
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Following substantially the same theory a like result has been reached
in other cases. Goldfinger v. Feintach, 159 Misc. 8o6, 288 N.Y.S.
855 (1936); Nann V. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690, 73
A.L.R. 669 (1931); Stillwell Theaters v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182
N.E. 63, 84 A.L.R. 6 (1932).
A more liberal treatment is also apparent in some cases arising under
the state and federal anti-injunction statutes, the courts holding that a
trade dispute exists when there is a conflict between an employer and
any body of men in the same class of employment as are his employees.
Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F (Supp.) 209
(1934, D.C. N.J.); Fenski Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union,
358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318 (934); Dehan v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees, etc., Local Union, 159 So. 637 (La.
App., 1935); Geo. B. Wallace Co., et al. v. International Assn of
Mechanics, etc., 155 Or., 63 Pac. (2d) 1090 (1936). American
Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W.
250 (1936).
The case law of Ohio on the subject is not crystallized to such an
extent that a valid generalization can be drawn therefrom. There is no
statute defining the term "trade dispute" and the majority of the lower
courts that have discussed the problem seem to adhere to the older view
that the concept is exclusive of any conflict except one that is between an
employer and his immediate employees, 24 0. Jur. 694, 2 O.S.L.J. 301
and cases cited (1936). Two cases, however, have sanctioned picketing
when there was no dispute between the employer and his own employees,
but only between him and the union. The S. A4. Clark Co. v. The
Cleveland Waiters & Dispensers Local No. zo6, et al., 22 Ohio App.
265, 154 N.E. 362 (1936); McCormick & Fisher v. Local Union
No. 216, Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 13 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 545,
32 C.D. 165 (1911).
The decision in the Senn case places the United States Supreme
Court in line with the more modern definition of a trade dispute in that
the court permitted picketing to force unionization and compliance with
union rules. In view of the rapid development of large scale unionism
and the resulting interdependence of interest between laboring men,
whether they be fellow employees or not, the decision is salutary and
shows a commendable willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to
take a realistic view of labor controversies.
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